The Oregon Hammonds Standoff

Last night “someone” asked me what I thought about what’s going on in Oregon with the Hammond family having to report today, January 4th,  to complete the remainder of a FIVE YEAR prison sentence for a fire they set on their property that unintentionally spread from the Hammond property over to adjacent federal lands (which the Hammonds were leasing from BLM).  The Hammonds were originally sentenced under mandatory Federal TERRORISM guidelines, and then the 9th Circuit court invalidated  US District Judge Hogan having subsequently reduced the Hammond’s sentence to 1 year (max). However the 9th Circuit then insisted the federal terms must be applied, even though this was clearly not a relevant “terrorism” situation, under the 1996 Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act.  The Hammond’s fire clearly involved no such terrorist intent whatsoever by the Hammonds, certainly in no way rationally comparable to the Oklahoma City bombing of the federal building, which motivated the Act — thereby highlighting why this mandatory sentencing is blatant federal tyranny.

The contact asking my thoughts on the Hammond situation in Oregon  did so by providing a video discussion of the Oregon events made by one “Montagraph”.   I now focus on Montagraph’s video because  it really exhibits the common misunderstanding of too many Americans regarding legitimate Federal authority and the actual terms of the Constitution, even as currently amended.

Montagraph’s video commentary on Oregon situation:

Montagraph really doesn’t understand the fundamental facts of the case and this country, and shouldn’t be spouting off about the Oregon Ranch issues at all.   Montagraph is grossly uninformed, and Exhibit A as to why Americans have lost their Liberty.

Fundamentally the issues in Oregon are exactly the same as the previous Bundy Ranch standoff in Nevada.

However, for starters,  Montagraph does not even recognize that the federal government has no legitimate authority in the States under the Constitution, which is true for both the Bundy and Hammond situations.  There is no constitutional authority for the federal government to claim any lands as federal other than forts, arsenals, dockyards and other “needful buildings”,  per Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution.  There is no authority to write laws directly applicable to the people within the several States.  There is no authority to transfer private lands within a State to federal authority. There is no authority for federal laws above and beyond State laws.

If anyone questions these assertions, then review Article 1, Section 8 of the ConstitutionPollard Lessee vs Hagan (excerpted at bottom of this post), and the Equal Footing Doctrine.  It is standing constitutional principle that every State is to be sovereign over all the territory within its borders upon statehood, yet this ongoing principle is routinely disregarded by the federal government as it engages an illegitimate authority.

THEN Montagraph repeatedly references the currently “occupied” nature preserve area in Oregon as  being a “Honey Trap”. Well, this is thoroughly ignorant, and it’s evident he does not know even what the phrase “honey trap” means.   He says, “It’s my personal opinion that this is a honey trap, yeah, uh huh.”  Is this his rendition of Ernest P. Worrell, or what?  Montagraph doesn’t even explain why, in his view, it might be a honey trap.   There’s no “honey” in the wildlife preserve  that they’ve occupied, nothing there that powerfully attracted them to occupy that facility, so it cannot be any sort of “honey trap” situation.

If the reclamation of our enduring rights and liberties is some sort of “trap”, then by all means it is a trap in dire need of being faced and removed, or we can no longer legitimately  call ourselves free Americans.

Then Montagraph indicates the militia supporters have encroached on federal property, and by doing so those militia “occupiers” have thrown the Constitution “out the window.”  However the claimed existence of that federal land itself is the only actual violation of the Constitution!  THEN Montagraph references Posse Comitatus, and use of the military  in policing action against civilians, saying it is “in the Constitution”.  No, it’s not in the Constitution at all,  but rather came from the second session of Congress.

Someone needs to smack this Montagraph on the back of the head for each and every ignorant word he spouts in this video. Montagraph is “Exhibit A” as to why Americans have lost their freedoms, and have been reduced to only dutiful slaves to an illegitimate federal authority involving the dictate of every aspect of our lives.  Montagraph is too ignorant on the very substantial issues to even know how ignorant he is, imagining somehow that this video might have some fragment of rationality to it.

Reference: Anti-Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty ACT – 1996

I close with a very powerful and compelling video by KrisAnne Hall:


Pollard Lessee v Hagan (1845)

The Supreme Court itself has repeatedly affirmed the sovereignty of states, whether they were a part of the union initially, or brought into the union subsequent to the country’s formation.

The Court case Pollard Lessee involved conflicting claims by the United States and Alabama to ownership of certain partially inundated lands in Alabama.  Take note that this case tests the consideration in which the federal government might possibly have some legitimate authority over those “inundated lands”, given that those lands are vaguely associated with waterways that legitimately fall under stipulated constitutional federal authority.

The enabling act for Alabama had contained both a declaration of equal footing and a reservation to the United States of those lands. However rather than the Court considering this as an issue of mere land ownership, the Court saw the question as one concerning sovereignty and jurisdiction of the States overall.

Given that the original 13 States retained sovereignty and jurisdiction over even the navigable waters and the soil beneath them, provided they lay  within that State’s boundaries, the retention by the United States of either title to or jurisdiction over common lands in the new States would bring those States into the Union on a less-than-equal footing with the original States.

The Court resolved:

“To Alabama belong the navigable waters and soils under them, in controversy in this case, subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United States; and no compact that might be made between her and the United States could diminish or enlarge these rights.”

“Alabama is, therefore, entitled to the sovereignty and jurisdiction over all the territory within her limits … to maintain any other doctrine, is to deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union on an equal footing with the original states … to Alabama belong the navigable waters and soils under them.”

Notice that this excerpt from the decision involves not only a recognition of Alabama’s sovereignty, but as with “unalienable” rights, that state sovereignty is also unalienable, and cannot by changed even by agreement (“compact”) made freely by the state itself! This inherently reserved sovereignty is undiminished by the fact that Alabama was originally a territory, entirely subject to congressional control.

Given that “No compact that might be made between [any state] and the United States could diminish these rights”, then this State sovereignty remains undiminished even by entry into the union

In regard to the claim that “most states don’t have such a provision” affirming their sovereignty, as a function of the Pollard Lessee holding, the Court also indicated that each and every state that joined subsequent to the Revolution, has the same rights as the original states…. and that no state could have rights recognized that are not shared equally by other states.

*** NOTE: The Court’s recognition in the Pollard case is not limited to “partially inundated” lands, but also applies more broadly to any territory within a State which the federal government may even have purchased at some point, both prior to statehood, or after that statehood.    While the Federal government may have constitutional authority to write laws applicable to forts, and other specifically stipulated federal lands, even those lands remain within the sovereign territory of each State, upon statehood, with the federal government’s ownership of specifically stipulated portions being only as a sort of elevated tenant. “No Compact that might be made … can alter these rights <State sovereignty>”

This puts new light on not only the federal government’s act of supplying and fortifying Fort Sumter upon the secession of the South, with this fortification of Sumter at the mouth of Charleston bay actually itself being the original act of war in directly threatening to the citizens of Charleston, but also applying to the Bundy Ranch standoff, as well as the more recent standoff in Oregon involving the Hammonds Ranch.


Ending Birthright Citizenship

Is Current Birthright Citizenship Legit?

In early 2015 GOP candidate debates, Carly Fiorina took issue  with Donald Trump’s stance against providing citizenship to the offspring born in this country of non-citizen parents. In response to Trump’s indications, Fiorina indicated that the 14th Amendment needed to be repealed, which is easier said than done. “The truth is you can’t just wave your hand and say the 14th Amendment is going to go away.”

Here is where other GOP candidates stand on so-called “birthright” citizenship.

Is it true that the 14th Amendment would need to be repealed, and that this birthright citizenship is constitutionally guaranteed?  No, none of that is true at all, and those advocating the removal of this corrupt birthright citizenship should be aware of the historic facts, detailed below.

The truth is that the Congress that drafted the 14th Amendment never intended to confer citizenship to the offspring of alien parents born on American soil.  It was not until THIRTY years after the 14th Amendment’s 1868 ratification that the courts fabricated anchor baby citizenship from thin air, in contradiction to the direct intent of the Congress, and in contradiction to several Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 14th Amendment.   Anchor baby citizenship is entirely a fabrication of the corrupt Gray Court in U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark (1898).

Contrary to some beliefs,  what the 14th Amendment indicates is nothing but the terms of citizenship as it had always been in this country.   However, the intent of the 14th Amendment was perverted by the Supreme Court, with the collusion of the Justice Department and San Francisco attorney George Collins.   Associate Justice Horace Gray, in United States vs Wong Kim Ark, changed the applicability of jurisdiction in the 14th Amendment, from the complete and total “political jurisdiction” of the United States, which even Gray himself recognized in Elk vs Wilkins, to then become mere  “legal jurisdiction”, being subject to laws.   It’s not as if being subject to laws has anything at all to do with citizenship, but this is the sophistry Gray presented in the ruling.

The intent of the 14th Amendment did not make citizens of offspring of alien parents born on American soil, but rather the Supreme Court’s malfeasance did so.   And the Supreme Court’s methodical malfeasance can be demonstrated, and the decision reversed, without requiring any amendment.

Below is the legislative history regarding citizenship, demonstrating the applicable terms of jurisdiction, from the time of the 14th Amendment’s ratification in 1868, until the Wong Kim Ark decision in 1898.


1862 John Bingham:

“Does the gentleman mean that any person, born within the limits of the Republic, and who has offended against no law, can rightfully be exiled from any State or from any rood of the Republic? Does the gentleman undertake to say that here, in the face of the provision in the Constitution, that persons born within the limits of the Republic, of parents who are not the subjects of any other sovereignty, are native-born citizens, whether they be black or white? There is not a textbook referred to in any court which does not recognize the principle that I assert.” (Cong. Globe, 37th, 2nd Sess., 407 (1862))

1866, two years before the 14th Amendment, by U.S. statute Sec. 1992 of U.S. Revised defined who is citizen:

“All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power … are declared to be citizens of the United States”

1866, John A Bingham:

John A. Bingham commenting on Section 1992 said it means “every human being born within the jurisdiction of the United States of parents not owing allegiance to any foreign sovereignty is, in the language of your Constitution itself, a natural born citizen.”  (Cong. Globe, 39th, 1st Sess., 1291 (1866))

The 1866 Congressional debates confirm that the two citizenship clauses — the one in the 14th Amendment, and the one in the 1866 Civil Rights Act — were intended to have the same meaning and effect. During those debates, the primary framers of the 14th Amendment citizenship clause, Sen. Jacob Howard and Sen. Lyman Trumbull, made it clear that “jurisdiction”, as used in the 14th Amendment, means sole and complete U.S. jurisdiction, i.e., not subject to any foreign power:

Sen. Lyman Trumbull: “The provision is, that “all persons born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.” That means “subject to the complete jurisdiction thereof.” What do we mean by “complete jurisdiction thereof?” Not owing allegiance to anybody else. That is what it means.”

Sen. Jacob Howard:  “[i] concur entirely with the honorable Senator from Illinois [Trumbull], in holding that the word ‘jurisdiction,’ as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States, coextensive in all respects with the constitutional power of the United States, whether exercised by Congress, by the executive, or by the judicial department; that is to say, the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as applies to every citizen of the United States now.

Civil Rights Act of 1866: The very same Congress that drafted the 14th Amendment (two months before the 14th, and recognized in Wong Kim Ark) defined citizenship in the first section:

“all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed.” 112 U.S. 99-103.

July 9, 1868: 14th Amendment was ratified:

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, AND subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States…”

1873, Slaughterhouse Cases

In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court indicated that the U.S.-born children of foreign citizens (including legal residents) are not subject to U.S. jurisdiction, therefore are not U.S. citizens under the 14th Amendment:

‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.’ … The phrase, ‘subject to its jurisdiction’ was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States.”
(Slaughter-House Cases, 1873)

What is significant about this recognition is that it excludes not only the offspring of illegal aliens, but also the offspring of legal aliens as well.  Furthermore, Children of Ambassadors, are excluded by the same reason as those children of non-citizen aliens, as are the offspring of Indians (not taxed) who reside in Indian territories within the United States.

1873 the United States Attorney General George Williams, who was a U.S. Senator aligned with Radical Republicans during the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, ruled the word “jurisdiction” under the Fourteenth Amendment to mean, which Justice Gray would recognize in Elk v.Wilkins years later:

The word “jurisdiction” must be understood to mean absolute and complete jurisdiction, such as the United States had over its citizens before the adoption of this amendment… Aliens, among whom are persons born here and naturalized abroad, dwelling or being in this country, are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States only to a limited extent. Political and military rights and duties do not pertain to them. (14 Op. Atty-Gen. 300.)

June 22, 1874, six years after the 14th’s ratificaiton, Congress issued a joint congressional report, House Report No. 784,  stating:

The United States have not recognized a double allegiance. By our law a citizen is bound to be ‘true and faithful’ alone to our government.

This is relevant because children of aliens (legal and illegal) are born with the allegiance (and citizenship) of their parents, as a general right recognized by the Law of Nations.

1884Elk vs Wilkins:
The Supreme Court reiterated that an individual is a 14th Amendment citizen only if the United States has complete jurisdiction over such individual at the  time of her or his birth or naturalization. Elk v Wilkins (1884) :

“The persons declared to be citizens are “all persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” The evident meaning of
these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction
of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing
them direct and immediate allegiance.”

Gray went on to further state in Elk:

“Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States…although in a
geographical sense born in the United States, are no more “born in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” within the meaning of
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,than the children of subjects
of any foreign government born within the domain of that government…”

1898, U.S. vs Wong Kim Ark:

The Court, under Justice Horace Gray, chose to award Wong Kim Ark with U.S. citizenship, rather than just recognize Ark’s “resident alien” status and right to return to the U.S., when Ark was prohibited from returning from China under Congress’s 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act.

The Wong Kim Ark decision fabricated a previously non-existent right to U.S. citizenship, nowhere indicated by Law or Amendment over the 30 years since the 14th, nor during this country’s entire previous 111 year history – thereby grossly “legislating from the Bench”.



What if you were to learn that there were only SIX things that needed to be recognized in order to restore this country …. just six?  We Don’t need to worry about all these varied schemes and plans to fix things, and we shouldn’t have to chase down every act and legislation and shout, “No!”  We just need to focus on six things!

There are a great many things that we Americans have forgotten about the Constitution, and if we were to only ourselves recognize these forgotten principles, we would regain our freedoms, and remove odious  federal tyranny from our lives.

In fact, the Constitution itself,  along with a little help from the Declaration of Independence, provides the only real “PLAN”  needed to restore our freedoms, and recover our country.


1)  NOT GRANTS: Our rights are not granted to us by the Bill of Rights, the first 10 Amendments to the Constitution, but rather are innate to us, unalienable, and only referenced in those Amendments relative to the creation of the federal government, which is the purpose of that Constitution.

2)  CANNOT BE AMENDED: Those rights are only referenced in the Constitution to recognize the federal government’s obligation to those rights,  but  this does not imply those rights might be edited or removed by amending them in the  Constitution under Article V, given that those rights are not provided thereby.  Neither does the reference to Rights in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution imply  those Rights are not applicable to the States themselves.  Those rights are applicable to the States, and the States have equal obligation to recognize them, .

3) STATE POWERS: 10th Amendment “States Rights” , more accurately “State Powers”,  do not provide the States authority to ignore those unalienable individual rights, and indeed the 10th Amendment concludes with “or to the people” thereby recognizing those unalienable rights held by the people.

4) LIMITED ENUMERATED POWERS:  Even as currently amended, nothing in the Constitution provides the federal the authority to write laws directly applicable to the people of the States  The only  location that the Constitution’s Enumerated Powers of Article 1, Section 8 allow the Congress to write laws directly applicable to the people, is the “exclusive Legislation” provided for the “10 miles square” area that is today known as Washington’s “District of Columbia” (D.C.).   Today that “exclusive” legislative authority for  D.C. has been delegated to a municipal council in D.C., thereby Congress should not be writing ANY LAWS directly applicable to the people of the United States.  All federal laws written by Congress that are directly applicable to the people of the States are an authority deliberately NOT provided Congress by the Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional, inclusive of Civil Rights legislation, hate crime legislation, national environmental legislation, legislation over food, firearms and agriculture, and the national health care mandate known as “ObamaCare”!

5) FEDERAL LANDS: The only lands Congress and the federal government have authority to own, are those lands recognized in those Enumerated Powers. Those indicated lands, beyond the referenced “10 miles square” area of the District of Columbia itself, are stated to be only “for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings “, that’s it!   Nowhere in the Constitution is the federal government given authority to claim lands within the sovereign territory of States  and govern general “public lands”, or to make “National Parks.”    Claimed federal control over these public lands and parks is nowhere legitimate under the Constitution and is therefore unconstitutional. (Reference: Equal Footing Doctrine, and Pollard Lessee vs Hagan)

6)  FEDERAL LAWS & TREATIES: The Supremacy Clause of Article Six, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, recognizes that Treaties are the law of the land, but only if those Treaties themselves are first “under the authority of the United States.”  Given that any and every representative of the United States has NO authority in their duties to exceed or violate the terms of the Constitution, the authority of the federal government cannot be exceeded as a result of any Treaty, nor can any foreign power be given any authority over citizens of the States by any Treaty.   Similarly,  that Supremacy Clause also indicates that all “laws of the United States” (federal laws) “shall be made in pursuance thereof” (i.e. in agreement with the terms of the Constitution).  These federal laws are only the legitimate “law of land” if these laws are in fact maintained to the limited terms of the Constitution.


If we as Americans were to only recognize this,  if movements such as the Tea Parties, or  Operation American Spring,  had only recognized these 6 “Secrets”, we would be an enormous way to restoring legitimate governance in this country,  and reclaiming our freedoms.

We the people are in fact the only “check” still remaining to stop government overreach, and it is time we stand up and exercise our authority.

i close with a powerful speech by KrisAnne Hall before the  Rowan County Oath Keepers, Faith, NC, March 29, 2015.

How Roberts Was Blackmailed To Support ObamaCare

I originally wrote this article and presented the research on January 28, 2013, on a now defunct forum, posted under my nickname “Trip”.  The story got serious traction across the blogosphere, and was picked up at such sites as “WhatReallyHappened” and “BeforeItsNews” (Archived).

INTRO: Many of us have questioned what caused Roberts to switch his vote on ObamaCare at the last minute,, and did this so late that the Conservative Justices were forced to rewrite their majority opinion to be minority dissent.

According to some sources, Roberts wrote both the majority and a large portion of minority dissenting opinions. The liberal news outlet has a story on July 3, 2012, “Roberts Wrote Both ObamaCare Opinions”, written by law professor Paul Campos, citing “a source within the court with direct knowledge of the drafting process.”

In this Salon article, Campos rejects the claim that the conservative minority wrote the dissenting opinion in response to Roberts’ majority opinion. Instead Campos’ source indicates that Roberts authored as much as the “first 46 pages” of the dissent, a full 70%, originally intended to be the majority opinion entirely rejecting ObamaCare. Only after Roberts switched his vote at the last minute did the remaining four Justices author the final 19 pages of that dissenting opinion. In support of this, Campos points out that it is extraordinary “in the court’s history that a dissent has gone on for 13,000 words before getting around to mentioning that it is, in fact, dissenting”, and yet there are repeated references to dissent from the majority opinion in those last 19 pages.

These facts may answer that question.

Roberts Adoptions:

In 2000 Justice Roberts and his wife Jane adopted two children. Initially it was apparent that the adoptions were “from a Latin American country”, but over time it has become apparent that the adopted children were not Latin American, but were Irish. Why this matters will become evident.

In 2005 the NY Times began investigating Roberts life as a matter of his nomination to the Supreme Court by George Bush. The Times was shortly accused of trying to unseal the adoption papers and intending to violate the anonymity of the adoption process… however there is more to the story.

Drudge did an article in 2005…

  • The NEW YORK TIMES is looking into the adoption records of the children of Supreme Court Nominee John G. Roberts, the DRUDGE REPORT has learned. The TIMES has investigative reporter Glen Justice hot on the case to investigate the status of adoption records of Judge Roberts’ two young children, Josie age 5 and Jack age 4, a top source reveals. Judge Roberts and his wife Jane adopted the children when they each were infants. Both children were adopted from Latin America. A TIMES insider claims the look into the adoption papers are part of the paper’s “standard background check.” Bill Borders, NYT senior editor, explains: “Our reporters made initial inquiries about the adoptions, as they did about many other aspects of his background. They did so with great care, understanding the sensitivity of the issue.”

Were the Children Adopted from Ireland?

At the time, the adoption terms of the children was uncertain.  The Associated Press reported that they were “adopted from Latin America.” This indication should have been noteworthy, particularly given the Time magazine report indicating that the children were born in Ireland. Also, their blond hair and fair skin do not seem conventionally Latin American. 1

TIME had a “web exclusive” on the Roberts’s (7/24/05) and therein quoted a family friend as stating the kids were “born in Ireland 4 1/2 months apart.”

How were the Children Adopted?

According to The New York Times, based on information from Mrs. Roberts’s sister, Mary Torre, the children were adopted through a private adoption.

As explained by Families for Private Adoption, “[p]rivate (or independent) adoption is a legal method of building a family through adoption without using an adoption agency for placement. In private adoption, the birth parents relinquish their parental rights directly to the adoptive parents, instead of to an agency.”2

But was Robert’s adoption utilizing “a legal method”?

Apparently the process of adopting Jack involved some stress for John Roberts. According to Dan Klaidman of Newsweek, during the contested 2000 election, Roberts “spent a few days in Florida advising lawyers [for George W. Bush] on their legal strategy,” but “he did not play a central role,” because ” at the time, Roberts was preoccupied with the adoption of his son.”

It is now quite evident that the two Children were from Ireland. Even wikipedia references these adoptions at the time of Roberts’ confirmation, and indicates that the children were of Irish birth.

However Irish law 1) prohibits the adoption of Children to non-residents, and 2) also does not permit private adoptions, but rather has all adoptions go through a public agency. This would explain the children’s origin from a “Latin American country”, so as to circumvent Irish law.

Evidently Roberts arranged for this adoption through some sort of trafficking agency, that contacted Irish women, arranged for them to be transported out of Ireland and into compliant Latin American countries, from which they were adopted, thereby circumventing Irish laws — entirely illegal, but perhaps quasi-legitimized by the birth mothers, two in this case, transporting the children out of Ireland.

Undoubtedly Roberts and his wife spent a great deal of money for this illegal process, circumventing Irish laws and arranging for the transit of two Irish children from separate birth-mothers to a foreign nation. As of 2012, those two children have been with the Roberts’ for roughly 10 years, since they were adopted as “infants”.

Some might feel an impulse dismiss this information, mistakenly believing Roberts and his wife were doing a good thing for a children needing a home. This would be a narrow perspective on what occurred. Such an inter-country adoption would only come about at great cost, and those who utilize this method are creating a for-profit black market in adoptive children, trafficking across international borders, and doing so from mothers who have not yet given up their children except for that profit. These actions are promoting a very unsavory profit-for-children human trafficking market that even necessitates immediate contact with new birth mothers in dire circumstances to offer financial gain. The entire arrangement is thoroughly predatory, turning children into aonly financial commodity, and even providing motivation for their birth mothers to give them up! That’s an important ethical recognition.

Roberts is not deserving of any sort of respect here, and is only the latest example of people in position believing themselves above the law, beyond scrutiny and exempt from repercussion.

It all now makes sense.

The circumstances of these two adoptions explain not only why this would be overlooked by an overall sympathetic media, but also why a sitting Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court would not want this information to become public fodder well into his tenure. Its release and public discussion would discredit Roberts as an impartial judge of the law, and undoubtedly lead to his impeachment.

This also explains why Roberts would have a means to be blackmailed, and why that leverage would still exist even after the institution of ObamaCare. …

And it has led to flipping the swing-vote on ObamaCare, which fundamentally changed the relationship between citizen and government, making us de facto property of the state, with our relative worth in care and maintenance able to be determined by the government. Essentially it was a coup without firing a shot, much less needing even an Amendment to the Constitution.

And it is consistent with Obama’s Chicago-style politics, that has previously involved opening other sealed <divorce> records in order to win election.

Irish Adoption Law
The weak point in this theory, beyond actual proof of blackmail, is the actual terms of Irish Adoption Law. However an overview of the widespread Irish Adoption laws do bear out the assertions. As a result of Irish adoption law being the accumulation of laws over the years, this following synopsis is an accurate representation of that law given no singular code can be directly referenced.

Reference: Overview of Ireland Adoption Law (PDF) The above document makes the following statements:

  • “The responsibility for making adoption orders is vested in the Irish Adoption Board, An Bord Uchtala. Before a final adoption order is made, the child usually is placed with the future adopter(s) by one of Ireland’s Registered Adoption Societies.” [page 1]

Who may adopt?

  • … “While the Irish acts do not require the applicants have Irish nationality or an Irish domicile, the applicants must be ordinarily resident in Ireland or have resident there during the year ending on the date of the order.“[Page 4]

Adoption Authorities:

  • “The adoption process in Ireland is regulated by the Adoption Board — the An Bord Uchtala — which consists of a Chairman and eight members. THe Adoption Board is an independent, quasi-judicial statutory body appointed by the Irish Government. It has the sole right to grant or refuse to grant adoption orders. The Board is also responsible for granting the declarations of eligibility and suitability to prospective adopters in advance of their adopting abroad and for maintaining the Register of Foreign Adoptions in which the details of intercountry adoptions are entered.” [Page 4]
  • “Before an adoption agency can accept a child for adoption, the person proposing to give the child up must be furnished with a statement explaining the effect of adoption order upon his or her rights and the provisions of the adoption acts relating to consents. An agreement to place the child with prospective adopters must be signed prior to the signing of consent. The agreement to place must have been made freely, with full knowledge of the consequences, and under circumstances where neither the advice of persons engaged in the transaction nor the surrounding circumstances deprive the mother of the capacity to make a fully informed free decision. In particular an agreement to place is “not valid if motivated by fear, stress or anxiety or dictated by parents or deprivations.“[Page 7]

There are no private adoptions. There are no overseas adoptions.

All adoptions go through the government board, An Bord Uchtala.

John Roberts was not ordinarily resident in Ireland, and was not resident there for the year ending on the date of an order that never passed through the Uchtala Board!

Furthermore, it is doubtful that Robert’s adoption afforded the adopting mothers (two) an environment that fully informed each of them of their rights, and was free of stress, anxiety, coercion and “deprivations”. In fact it is virtually certain that the process involved removing two children and their respective mothers from Ireland, and any support structure they might have had there, not to mention removing them from the purview of Irish law!

This whole exercise was highly illegal and unethical.  Even if John Roberts was not blackmailed, these conditions would undeniably provide leverage for extortion to use against a sitting Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Disarming America in 3 Easy Steps

“A well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State,

   … the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”

—  2nd Amendment, U.S. Constitution

That is what the single sentence indicates, which is our 2nd Amendment.  This one sentence Amendment addresses our right to keep and bear arms, but does not actually itself provide us that right.   The compound sentence begins with a  13-word dependent clause,  followed by  an independent clause, both being separated by a comma.   The Independent clause  indicating that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed”, is undeniably the purpose of the single sentence amendment.

One would think such a clear and simple sentence would be straightforward and readily understood, but not when subject to the deliberate abuses of manipulative minds, often with alphabet–soup credentials providing a crutch.

This past Thanksgiving  I was directed to a brand new article by Dr. Edwin Vieira, Jr., Ph.D., J.D.  titled,  “COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT”.     Evidently that article was only the latest of a series of similar efforts in the form of articles, books, and DVDs, going back at least to 2012, with other titles such as “Thirteen Words”, and  “The Sword and Sovereignty: The Constitutional Principles of “the Militia of the Several States”, all promoting the Militia.

You may be asking, “What’s the matter with his argument promoting the Militia? ” All of us on the Right generally support the militia,  and so does Vieira, correct?  Bear with me (pun intended).

Vieira’s most recent article disguises a direct assault on the Individual right to keep and bear arms, by hiding  that attack behind criticism of the National Rifle Association (NRA) for not specifically engaging in any direct support of Militias.   Vieira emotionally enlists the onlooker in that attack via their own support of militias.  Make no mistake, this is a calculated move on Vieira’s part,  which enables  him to engage non-personalized criticism of the “cognitive dissonance” of those who ignore those first 13 words of the 2nd Amendment addressing militias, in deference to the clearly stated right of the people to keep and bear arms,  which “”shall not be infringed.”

Vieira  indicates that persons have  “cognitive dissonance”,  as a result of promoting the “historically inaccurate and legally indefensible so-called ‘individual right to keep and bear arms’ “(DailyBell, Feb 10, 2013).

Yet Vieira would have us believe that the passive actor in the dependent clause , “A Militia”, which is necessary in some unspecified capacity of securing a free State, is the actual focus of the 2nd Amendment, and not any sort of individual “right of the people”, recognized in the Bill of Rights, whose purpose is to secure individual rights, which Vieira views as “indefensible,” at least in this particular instance.

Such an argument itself is in no way reasonable, much less historically accurate.

MILITIA – Publicly Sanctioned Body

Vieira makes his first enormous leap regarding what that militia actually is, repeatedly implying  that a valid militia must  be a publicly recognized body with (apparently) some sort of official State sanction, given that the Amendment itself references “State”.   However Vieira is never quite clear on  what this sanctioning would actually entail, or  what level of participation is congruent with the Constitution’s principles.     Despite this, Vieira is repeatedly  playing on the subconscious, addressing the validity of a publicly recognized and organized capital “M” Militia, as opposed to a loosely formed lowercase “m”, militia, which he does not directly address, but is readily apparent throughout.

It should be recognized that  the 2nd Amendment ratified by the States  in 1792, capitalized neither “state” nor “militia”, however what Congress officially drafted had both “State” and “Militia” capitalized.  There has been considerable historic debate over that capitalization, particularly in regard to the militia clause.  What’s fascinating is that Vieira alters his own capitalization of Militia throughout the article, with the capital “M” being applied to an organized, directed and sanctioned Militia, and lowercase militia evidently used when referencing the less-reputable and poorly organized “unofficial” militia. 

If those founders particularly wanted to only recognize militia as having the right to keep and bear arms, they most certainly would have had the 2nd Amendment stipulate  “the right of the militia to keep and bear arms,” but they did not do so.  Recognition of this fact alone, should undermine claims that a capitalized “Militia” has any overriding significance.

While Vieira does  make a minimal effort to  indicate that a militia is actually all able-bodied persons of age, he does not waste any time leaping to indicate that those able-bodied persons are not properly trained and disciplined, thereby questioning their competency, and perhaps legitimacy as well:

As Article 13 of Virginia’s Declaration of Rights (1776) exemplified, America’s Founders knew that “a well regulated militia” is “composed of the body of the people, trained to arms”—not of some small, élitist group, with the rest of the citizenry relegated to inactivity, ignorance, and lack of instruction. So, the constitutional requirement of near-universal service (and therefore training) in the Militia having been allowed to atrophy, of course the Union troops came to their military service devoid of even rudimentary proficiency in the use of arms.  That is, the NRA’s mission became plausible only because the institutions the Second Amendment declares to be “necessary” had theretofore been rendered moribund. (Pg 1, Par 12)

Vieira himself nowhere offers clear evidence of any sort of  “constitutional requirement”  of near-universal service in the militia, but rather this claim seems to be a derivative of Vieira’s own interpretation.   There is little to suggest the application of any sort of universal requirement in America’s early constitutional history. Perhaps Vieira misconstrues the near-universal membership in ad hoc militias involving some sort of compulsion, but  that near-universal compulsion, if it exists at all, is nowhere directly indicated in the terms of the Constitution, whose purpose is to provide the terms for the federal government itself.

Of note, the NRA consistently serves as the scapegoat for the lack of general proficiency in firearms, due allegedly to a failed understanding on the part of the NRA,  but nowhere allowing for any misunderstanding by Vieira himself.

In fact Vieira would turn us unto a militarist society  with “near-universal compulsory service, including actual training with arms.Apparently Vieira believes that a “free State” must be synonymous with a militarized State,  despite history itself being replete with examples contradicting this philosophy.  My own perspective of this country’s history, and the Founder’s intent, is that this is not at all what they revered.   I see no value obtained in the American populace becoming Brownshirts.

Right to Arms – Collective, not Individual

Vieira then makes a SECOND mistaken leap of assumption, which the reader should have anticipated at this point:   given that the right to keep and bear arms is associated with the militia as an organized body,  therefore  the right to keep and bear arms must be a “COLLECTIVE right” held only by those organized and recognized militias, and not any sort of individual right at all.

“In order to overcome the psychological discomfort that must arise out of their dissecting this single sentence and discarding half of it, these advocates of the Second Amendment supply the rationalization that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms” is an individual right, whereas “[a] well regulated Militia” is a collective undertaking—and therefore they can dismiss the Amendment’s first thirteen words as not having any controlling legal, logical, or even linguistic influence on the following fourteen.” (pg 1, Par 2)

While Vieira posits the psychological discomfort of those who discard the first thirteen words of the 2nd Amendment, he recognizes no similar psychological discomfort on his own part resulting from turning the Second Amendment away from being  a right held by the people themselves.  Instead the passive Militia is turned into the overriding purpose of the Second Amendment.    Evidently, in Vieira’s view,  the mere reference to this militia is cause for the founders to be great believers in collective rights, even though I cannot recall any one of the founders ever expounding on the merits of such collective rights, which are solely a fabrication of more contemporary times:

“Obviously, the Framers both of the original Constitution and of the Second Amendment were fully aware of the relationship between individual and collective rights (and duties, for that matter) with respect to “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms”, because they conjoined those rights (and duties, too) in the Militia.”  (Pg 1, Par 3)

Here  Vieira is actually using circular logic to validate his claim that the Second Amendment represents a collective right, because it references a militia which is a collective exercise, ignoring the possibility of that individual right having a valid  collective expression, in addition to individual necessity.  What Vieira ignores here is almost as disturbing as what he focuses upon.  Certainly there are individual  rights that are exercised collectively, such as the freedom of speech, that may  be further exercised in a collective under the Freedom of Assembly, or the Freedom of Religion engaging its own free assembly in church congregations. The Freedoms of Speech and Religion would not be of much real value in a society without each having a concomitant collective expression.

Ultimately, if the right to keep and bear arms is a collective right, then we have empowered whatever might be the biggest collective to control our lives,. and given arms to those who would act in that body’s name, which would be arming  Democratic tyranny.

Collective Right  =  “No Gun Control”

Vieira is indeed a savvy manipulator, drawing the reader into his argument by claiming, were the Militia revitalized, all obnoxious ‘gun control’ would be eliminated at one stroke, forever” ( Pg 2, Para 8 ).  However Vieira does not there fully disclose that the gun control would be “eliminated forever”  due to the individual right to firearms having already been implicitly relinquished, to only be retained by the collective Militia Somehow Vieira imagines it a victory prohibiting the gun controllers from the “complete disarmament of the American people”, by limiting gun possession to only those in an official capital “M” Militia.  Again, Brownshirts anyone?

What Vieira has done, all while maintaining the NRA as the scapegoat, is to walk the reader down the logical path of:

Step 1) first making the militia a publicly sanctioned group, then

Step 2) recognizing the right to keep and bear arms as a collective right.

Step 3, in the Tyrant’s Handbook, is then to remove the public sanction of more and more militias, thereby denying them any right to keep and bear arms, and very soon all of America would be disarmed, all a consequence of Vieira’s rationalization.  Very likely along the way, all guns would be registered,  both to ensure all firearms were held lawfully by militia members (since it really isn’t an individual right), and likely also the result of some outcry over the militias themselves not keeping sufficient control on their collective firearms.   And the most amazing thing about this plan is that no individual rights would be taken, and only collective groups, that once had “rights”, were disavowed and disbanded.  This is just one of the many reasons why this nation’s founders never recognized anything similar to collective rights.

The fact that these individual rights are exercised in collective groups, does not make them collective rights.  However by recognizing them as a  collective right,  Vieira then surreptitiously has those rights no longer recognized as an individual right, thereby making the leap to individuals no longer being subject to gun control.

In making this gross assumption of the right to keep and bear arms being a collective right, Vieira blatantly ignores the fact that the Bill of Rights is entirely discussing Individual Rights, nowhere collective rights,  The only place those original 10 Amendments deviate from addressing individuals is with the 10th Amendment’s reference to State powers, and that Amendment is to ensure the various States security from the federal government itself.  There is no evidence that “collective rights” had any  significance to the founders, with them vehemently rejecting Democracy itself.

  • While Vieira makes the claim of the “collective right” being tied to a Militia,  at no point does Vieira even question why that Amendment itself does not reference the militia’s right to keep and bear arms, instead recognizing that right as residing with “the people.”
  • If those founders particularly wanted to only recognize militia as having the right to keep and bear arms, they most certainly would  have specified in Second Amendment, “the right of the militia to keep and bear arms,” but they did not do so.  Recognition of this fact should undermine claims that a capitalized “Militia” has any real significance.

To be fair, Vieira does soften the distinction between collective and individual right, indicating:

“In short, the Second Amendment cannot be construed so as to set up a distinction, let alone a conflict, between an “individual” and a “collective” “right of the people to keep and bear Arms”. The “individual” and the “collective” right are two sides of the very same coin.” (Pg 1, Par 3)

However if there really is no distinction, or conflict, between collective and individual rights, then Vieira should have ceased using the NRA as a scapegoat after the third paragraph.  However with the NRA no longer serving as strawman, then the reader would be forced to contemplate the removal of their individual right to keep and bear arms, not to mention their compulsory enlistment in a Militia.

The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution indicates neither of these things:

“The right of the Militia to keep and bear arms”

“The right to keep and bear arms…. ”  (generally)

But rather the Second Amendment specifically indicates, “the right of the people to keep and bear arms”, and therefore is directly referencing the right of individuals themselves to those arms, which is in no way legally “indefensible”, but rather is recognized as the law of the land.

Perhaps as we leave one year behind, and enter into this New Year, we should all pause and recognize that, even under the best of times, the various policing forces of the Federal, State, and Local governments have never provided for our personal security, much less guaranteed that security, being more interested in establishing our adherence to rules and directives.

Historically, it has always been the concern of every individual American to provide that security for themselves, with this possibly being even more necessary today.  As such, it is entirely an individual right, and in no way “collective.”  Once we recognize those collective rights, then “someone” (invariably the government)  steps in to pick and choose which individuals may be recognized as having those rights, with individual Freedoms undoubtedly suffering as a result.

Are “Common Law” Grand Juries Valid?

INTRO: With various applications of common law grand juries currently being popular, such as the case in Dixie County Florida, where Terry Trussell, formerly of Operation American Spring, is facing 14 felony charges for “Impersonating a Pubic Officer” and “Unlawful Use of Simulated Legal Process”, among other charges, now facing the possibility of the remainder of his life behind bars, or the Nevada common law grand jury claiming to have proved the “missing” 13th Titles of Nobility amendment was actually ratified by Virginia and thereby an actual amendment to the Constitution, or  National Liberty Alliance’s own “Quo Warranto” (pdf) petition to various federal judges, these issues are obviously increasing in number, and should be considered.

5) CONCLUSIONS: What is evident.


Some have claimed that Common Law Grand Juries are supported by the Constitution itself, and even cite  Supreme Court decisions, particularly United States v Williams (1992), as supporting these ad hoc common law grand juries.  However these claims do not appear to have any actual truth to them.

The only place the U.S. Constitution specifically references “common law” is the 7th Amendment, where it is actually referenced to prohibit the common law practice of Courts creating law from the bench in cases where there is no written law, and does this by affirming the right to a trial by jury, thereby prohibiting government dictate of what the law is,   and minimizing a source  of tyrannous dictate.  As a result, the 7th Amendment is actually undermining that common law, rather than affirming common law practice as any sort of guiding philosophy of this country.  This is discussed further in the comments section.

In 1992, Antonin Scalia made citations to the Grand Jury in United States v Williams, and referenced a few Supreme Court cases in doing so:

Hannah v. Larche (1960): “Rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history.”

United States v. Chanen (1977, citing Nixon v. Sirica, 1973): “the grand jury is mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but not in the body of the Constitution. It has not been textually assigned, therefore, to any of the branches described in the first three Articles. It is a constitutional fixture in its own right.”

Scalia also stated: “the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose functioning the courts do not preside…”

Scalia there also indicated:

“In fact, the whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 (1906); G. Edwards, The Grand Jury 28-32 (1906). Although the grand jury normally operates, of course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length. Judges’ direct involvement in the functioning of the grand jury has generally been confined to the constitutive one of calling the grand jurors together and administering their oaths of office. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 6(a). [504 U.S. 36, 48] “

Of note, all of the above references are specifically to “Grand Jury” and nowhere particularly indicating “common law grand jury”, thereby not serving to validate those common law grand juries, contrary to claims.

In fact the idea of an ad hoc common law grand jury being formed entirely independently of the judicial system is undermined by Scalia’s above statement, “in the courthouse and under judicial auspices”.  These Supreme Court references in no way serve to validate “common law grand juries”, as they are currently being envisioned and formed, but rather provide cause to question their validity.

The claim is made that these common law grand juries actually have precedent in American history, which is somewhat true, but overall inaccurate.  During America’s early history, when there were municipalities or districts without any established court of their own, circuit judges would indeed travel from district to district and sometimes rely on the presentment “charges” of temporary grand juries composed of the local populace, in order to hold trials.  However these grand juries were not formed from hand-picked jurors, resulting in a stacked jury, nor did they involve claims of absolute authority above any existing courts, as is currently being done.  There is no validation for what is currently being done in America’s past, or Britain’s common law either.

Attorney Leo Donofrio, who led two of the earliest court challenges to Obama’s qualification to hold the Presidency in New Jersey and Connecticut, has also been an early proponent of using Grand Juries to pursue government wrong-doing. In fact Donofrio wrote an early article titled “The Federal Grand Jury is the 4th Branch of Government”, in which citizens use these Grand Juries to counter and correct government wrong-doing and corruption. However Donofrio later removed that article from his blog when a Georgia Grand Jury, allegedly inspired by Donofrio himself, indicated it had authority to confiscate people’s property, and even take their homes, which would be criminal acts.

That article is still available on the Internet “Wayback” archive site here:
The Federal Grand Jury is the 4th Branch of Government

Take note, in that article title Donofrio specifies that it is the “Federal” Grand Jury that is the 4th branch of government, not just any Grand Jury, and notably not “common law”.

Donofrio then wrote an article titled, “The Georgia Citizens Grand Jury Must Be Condemned” in which Donofrio made the following clarification of his previous discussion of FEDERAL Grand Juries:

We are governed by our Constitution, not common law.

My grand jury 5th amendment “power of presentment” articles were meant to educate people as to their power ONCE SWORN IN AS A FEDERAL GRAND JUROR in a federal court.

The articles weren’t meant to encourage citizens to form their own grand juries and prosecute at will. There is no such guarantee in the Constitution. And I am a true believer in the Constitution. Are you?

Here Donofrio indicates that there is no such authority for people to independently form their own “common law” Grand Jury, under the belief they might prosecute “at will”.

Unfortunately we have very extreme, ill-formed, and even dangerous beliefs held by these common law grand jury proponents, none of which are valid.

The  National Liberty Alliance indicates (pdf) indicates the source of authority for these common law grand juries is the common law itself, stating, “”The Common Law is the jurisdiction that our founders set in motion when creating the United States of America” and “Common Law is Natural Law, America was founded on Common Law.”  None of these claims are even remotely true.  This country’s original foundation in British common law, did not involve any separate jurisdiction, and that common law was not actually relied on by the Constitution, which brought the United States of America into existence, but rather is profoundly rejected by that Document.  Furthermore, “common law” is not at all the same thing as Natural Law and, in fact, the two considerations are entirely separate from one another, even by definition!  While the States originally utilized some terms, principles and practices inherited from British common law, that common law was never a founding principle of this country, and the Constitution in no way relied on common law.

” The common law of England is not the common law of these states.”
George Mason, “Father of the Bill of Rights”
Debate in Virginia Ratifying Convention, 19 June 1788
“The common law is gone. The federal courts never applied the common law and even in the state courts it’s codified now.”
Justice Antonin Scalia, Federalist Society address, Nov 22, 2008

There is a glaring irony in NLA’s “Quo Warranto” asking “by what authority” those federal judges act, and this irony involves  questioning the very authority by which NLA itself demands those judges fill out their questionnaire, and demands they provide a “surety bond”, or else provide their detailed financial statement, with the obvious presumption being that NLA itself will act entirely illegally to confiscate that bond, or those financial assets, when NLA deems they have not adhered to unspecified common law principles that do not exist, and are not a part of this country!

The Nevada “Superior Court Common Law Venue” indicates its own jurisdiction to to be “Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction”, and prominently declares ahead of its findings that, “Its decision cannot be reviewed by any other court of the land.”  Oh really? It is impossible that a grand jury formed in 2014, without any authority under law, to have any “original” jurisdiction at all, much less “exclusive” jurisdiction.  Furthermore, every single American should be disturbed by any group willing to declare itself entirely UN-contestable, above any law and court, and unable to even be questioned, much less challenged.


There is a gross misunderstanding of what the “common law” is on the National Liberty Alliance site, and by “common law grand jury” proponents generally.  The Common Law is not something sacrosanct in this country, and is NOT at all synonymous with our own understanding of Natural Law unalienable rights.

British common law is nothing more than the cumulative decisions, practices and general principles of the British courts that were never codified into law.  That’s it!

British common law, which we inherited as British ourselves, is nothing fact “common law”  nothing more than “case law”, or reliance on case “precedent”.

Common law (also known as case law or precedent) is law developed by judges through decisions of courts and similar tribunals that decide individual cases, as opposed to statutes adopted through the legislative process or regulations issued by the executive branch.

As recognized in the United States, that “common law” got its name for the laws that were derived from the various decisions made by British circuit court judges actually empowered to make the law themselves. Originally these judge-derived laws were all made locally. When these local judge-derived laws were recognized by a large number of those various circuit courts, those laws were recognized as being held in common across the land, and thereby given more weight than laws that only had local recognition. Over time these un-codified Court-decreed laws, commonly recognized across Britain, became recognized as the “common law”.

British common law is founded on Feudal philosophy of noblesse oblige wherein a person is born into a position in society with obligation to those above them.

British common law actually references the “Law of Nature”, in representing this “natural” feudal obligation to those above oneself in society, as discussed at length in Lord Coke’s decision in Calvin’s Case, 1608:

This Law of Nature, which indeed is the eternal Law of the Creator, infused into the heart of the creature at the time of his creation, was two thousand years before any Laws written, and before any Judicial or Municipal Laws. (Coke(1608), p.196)

It hath been proved before, that ligeance or obedience of the inferior to the superior, of the subject to the Sovereign, was due by the Law of Nature many thousand years before any Law of man was made: Which ligeance or obedience (being the onely mark to distinguish a subject from an alien) could not be altered; therefore it remaineth still due by the Law of Nature. (Coke(1608), pp.197-8)

It is “natural” for persons to be subservient to those above them.  Thus the common law view of the “law of nature” is in direct and total conflict with our own “natural law”  unalienable rights, coming from “Nature’s God”, upon which this nation was founded.  In fact it by the deliberate intent to severe the common law authority of the state upon our lives, that the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress from enacting any law establishing religion.

These feudal common law principles result in the doctrine of “Perpetual Allegiance,” an indelible obligation to  Crown, country and one’s superiors that can never be broken, never severed by one’s own choice, unless by death itself.   As Americans, we specifically rejected that feudal common law doctrine of Perpetual Allegiance in the War of 1812.

Under British common law, the law of the Creator is conflated with the law of England and being lain down via edict to the common man under authority of the divine Crown through the judiciary. The King is viewed as both head of the Anglican church and state as well.   By this,  under common law,  anyone in disagreement with the state is viewed as a hostile, with Jews being recognized as enemies with no real standing in Court, and having little assurance as to property rights.

Natural Law is recognized, by definition, as being entirely outside of man-made Positive Law.  That man-made Positive Law consists of “statute”, those laws that are codified and written down, and those things that are not codified as any singular law but still recognized as directing principle, “case law”, with this generally including what is referenced as “common law.” However “common law” is not necessarily recognized as being binding.  Common Law is a part of that man-made Positive Law, and entirely outside of Natural Law.

Natural Law and Common Law really have nothing to do with one another.

Given these facts, the claim that “common law” grand juries have some overriding authority, and are founded in American principles protecting individual rights, is a stunning ignorance demonstrating a failed understanding of both this country, as well as the issues these groups claim authority regarding.  Beyond that, such a reliance on Common Law invites the very despotism that we seek to free ourselves from. .


If such a thing were ever recognized, it would eventually result in citizen’s grand juries being formed at a whim, and “stacked” with people intending to reach a pre-ordained conclusion, resulting in presentments or indictments for things that really are not all that legitimate.   Someone might even be criminally charged for eating a pastry into the shape of a gun.

Then there’s always the old cliche, “a grand jury would indict a ham sandwich.”

Imagine the pure Hell that would be unleashed if the angry mobs in Ferguson could legitimately form their own “common law Grand Jury”, and then pronounce a true bill presentment charging Officer Wilson with First Degree Murder, overruling the previous Grand Jury, and  the Missouri State Attorney would then be obligated to follow up on that charge, by arresting and trying Wilson for his very life. This could still happen despite a Grand Jury having already resolved that there was no evidence to charge Wilson.

Why wouldn’t a grand jury formed by and from those angry mobs of Ferguson be valid? There is no special process involved in forming or validating those “common law” grand juries, and certainly everything inviting them to be “stacked” with people of whatever belief. That “angry Ferguson mob” could form their own “common law” grand jury, every bit as legitimate as any other common law grand jury.

Seriously, pause and consider if this were true,  any group of people could go off and form their own legitimate “common law” grand jury, and suddenly you yourself might have to answer to that jury’s charges in an official court of law.

Or WORSE!  If they can do their own charges (presentments), why not their own convictions too?  We might have to answer to some unknown body of people, formed under unknown terms, acting entirely outside of the legal system, perhaps not even convening inside a courthouse, perhaps with a serious grudge against us for whatever reason, and they would be able to actually put us on trial for  something, anything, perhaps having us fight in their fabricated court for our very lives!

If such things were allowed, none of us, not-a-one, would ever be safe from wild charges coming out of nowhere, or trials for our very life, liberty, and property in “no holds barred” makeshift courts in the middle of nowhere. No one would ever be truly safe.

This is not how we fix things. It is how the justice system and society itself would become forever broken, subject to mob rule, and America lost in absolute Anarchy, never to be a Republic again.


As noted previously, above, the common law grand jury proponents claim that Scalia actually supports common law grand juries, in United Stats vs. Williams  . However to assert this, these claimants themselves  must mentally impose, or replace, every instance of “Grand Jury” with  “common law grand jury”, which is nowhere indicated in the decision of the case.

Beyond that, to claim the legitimacy of the broad powers they do, these common law proponents must entirely ignore other indications by Scalia in UNITED STATES vs. WILLIAMS 504 U.S. 36 (1992)

For example,  Scalia makes several references to the investigative powers (i.e. “presentments“) of a Grand Jury acting independently of the court and prosecutor:

Scalia: “The grand jury’s functional independence from the judicial branch is evident both in the scope of its power to investigate criminal wrongdoing, and in the manner in which that power is exercised. “Unlike [a] [c]ourt, whose jurisdiction is predicated upon a specific case or controversy, the grand jury `can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even because it wants assurance that it is not.’United States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U. S. ___, ___ (1991) (slip op. 4) (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643 (1950)). It need not identify the offender it suspects, or even “the precise nature of the offense” it is investigating. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).”

Scalia: “The grand jury requires no authorization from its constituting court to initiate an investigation, see Hale, supra, at 59-60, 65, nor does the prosecutor require leave of court to seek a grand jury indictment.”

It is clear that a Grand Jury has the authority to independently investigate wrongdoing, and do so without any direction from the Court.

However NOWHERE  does Scalia, or any of the  citations provided in U.S. vs. Williams, indicate that the Grand Jury has the same independent authority to prosecute, indict and pronounce guilt.   Why is this?

There is no reference to independent Grand Jury indictments, because the Grand Jury has no lawful authority itself to summon witnesses, to demand testimony under oath, or to compel the production of evidence!

The Grand Jury has no authority beyond the action of its own body, thereby being incapable itself  of acting with any authority to compel or order others. Scalia touches on this fact by indicating:

True, the grand jury cannot compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of evidence, and must appeal to the court when such compulsion is required. See, e. g., Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959). And the court will refuse to lend its assistance when the compulsion the grand jury seeks would override rights accorded by the Constitution, see, e. g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)

The authority of the Court itself must be sought for any sort of force to compel others to act, otherwise other individual’s rights would necessarily be at risk in the process.   This is to prohibit  that the Grand Jury from acting as judge, jury and “executioner” —  a kangaroo court.

Yet this is not what we see coming from these “common law grand juries”, whose first violation of legitimacy is to suppose themselves having lawful investigative power to indicate charges (presentments), when they are nothing but a body that is stacked with like-minded people to reach a pre-ordained conclusion.   This is what Terry Trussell did when he formed his own common law grand jury.   Of itself, the formation of this common law grand jury and reaching a conclusion, resolving  allegations of wrongdoing, is not a violation of law.   Such action is nothing more than what people themselves do every day when they gather together and have a common opinion. However when Trussell  tried to insert that Common Law Grand Jury into the position of the previous Grand Jury, even occupying the Courthouse, and providing its presentments to the court as legitimate, then Trussell was violating the law, by “UNLAWFUL USE OF A SIMULATED LEGAL PROCESS” and “IMPERSONATING A PUBLIC OFFICER”.

Numerous people are of the opinion that Trussell is being wrongly prosecuted, and should be free of all charges, among them Colonel Harry Riley.   Unfortunately these people do not realize the gravity of Trussell’s offenses.  The fact that Florida is a “common law state”, really does not mean what John “Darash” of National Liberty Alliance teaches it to mean.  The common law nowhere provides the sort of authority and license that is being claimed.  Furthermore, not even the Florida Constitution provides the County Commissioners the authority to empanel a common law grand jury to review Trussell’s case, despite Trussell’s supporters indicating that it does so, making their appeal nothing but poor understanding compounded by poor research, asking for a remedy that the County Commissioners have no authority to provide.

These “common law” grand juries typically make gross presumptions of authority that they do not have. We see this in the Nevada Grand Jury claiming “Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction” and that “its decision cannot be reviewed by any other court of the land”.    We see this presumed authority again with NLA’s “Quo Warranto” demanding questionnaires be answered,  bonds be provided, and threatening repercussions, even while providing unclear and inaccurate terms of what must be adhered to (the “common law”), and with those repercussions necessarily involving that “common law grand jury” acting as “judge, jury and executioner”.

None of these investigations, conclusions, charges, or even ignorant letters making demands,  pose any real legal problem, …  until they are actually acted upon, and then they  become evidence of deliberate intent to violate both the law, and person’s rights.  Being ignorant is not itself a crime, but acting on that ignorance often can be.  Conspiracy charges might even be brought against all those common law grand jury members involved.

This is serious stuff, folks, and all of it is entirely contrary to the U.S. Constitution.  Do you actually stand by that Constitution, and uphold it?

Thankfully, America does not have any such tradition providing authority for these “Kangaroo” proceedings, nor does any sane country in the history of mankind.  The reason this authority does not exist, is the protection of each of our individual rights, including you and me, and those “common law” grand jury members themselves.  Think about that.


What is clear from the evidence thus far considered regarding Grand Juries, generally, and more narrowly, the so-called “common law” grand juries:

1)  Grand Juries are not, and have never been, recognized by the legal system unless they operate “within the courthouse and under judicial auspices.”   By our own consistent history, any group acting outside the legal system, and pretending  legal authority, is operating [only] under the color of law  and is, at minimal, extra-legal  if not actually “unlawful” and “illegal”, and is recognized as a “mob” or kangaroo court.   Such groups have generally become defendants before the very Law they attempt to falsely wield.

2)  That same “common law” Case Law precedent, by which National Liberty Alliance (NLA), and other groups,  claim that these ad hoc grand juries have their authority,  is the very means by which our Constitution and laws have been subverted, relying on (common law) precedent that is progressively ever-more outside of actual law, and the Constitution itself.  Given this, reliance on that “common law” precedent cannot reasonably remedy the problems at hand.

3)  The “common law” is not now, nor has it ever been, a governing principle of this country, is not the source of our unalienable rights, even by definition, and reference to such ‘common law” cannot reasonably provide any loose body of people any sort of legitimate authority whatsoever, much less an absolute authority, as is the claim,

4)  Application of the adjectives “common law”, or “Citizen’s”, or “People’s” to an ad hoc body of people acting as if a Grand Jury,  does not provide that group with any actual legal authority whatsoever, and nowhere in history has it ever done so.

5)  Grand Juries have legitimate authority  only over that body itself. Every assertion of authority beyond that self-direction, including interactions with evidence, witnesses, oaths, and testimony, comes to that Grand Jury only via association with the established legal system itself.

6)  Grand Juries (generally) may investigate whatever they want, and may draw their own accusations of wrongdoing, and do so at-will, just as any gathering of people might do on their own.

7)   No Grand Jury, not even one empaneled within the legal system, has any absolute assurance that the legal system will recognize and act upon its charges, much less any authority to compel the legal system to act on those charges. .

8)  Grand Juries CANNOT, of their own  authority, by power held by that body itself, compel testimony, or demand evidence, demand questionnaires be answered, demand Quo Warranto’s be answered, demand provision of bond, etc.,  when this information is not provided of free will.

9)  Grand Juries, of their own authority, acting independently of any legal system, CANNOT administer an oath, compel testimony under oath, nor adjudge the material violation of an oath which that body itself had no authority to administer in the first place.

10)  Grand Juries  CANNOT “indict at will”,  and have no authority in that body itself to exact any sort of penalty in real terms.

NEW EVIDENCE: Intent of 1790 Naturalization Act

 NEW EVIDENCE:  Intent of 1790 Naturalization Act


1) In 1969 Pinckney McElwee uncovered evidence in the House Committee notes from 1795  which indicate that the reason  the reference to natural born citizen (NBC),  included in the 1790 Naturalization Act, but entirely removed from the 1795 Naturalization Act, was that people would wrongly infer that that Act was actually intending that those born overseas outside the country  were to become natural born citizens.  Clearly Madison was not wanting to make natural born citizens of the children born overseas to American parents.  On June 14, 1967, Representative John Dowdy introduced McElwee’s unpublished article, “Natural Born Citizen” (pg 10), on the House floor, to the U.S. House of Representatives.  Until recently, the import of this evidence has been largely unrecognized.

2) If they were not intending to make them natural born citizens, as McElwee’s evidence from the 1795 House Commitee notes indicates, THEN the founders were using the reference to NBC in the original 1790 Naturalization Act in some other way than to actually confer NBC status.   That other intended use involves  the reference to “natural born citizen” being employed as “SIMILIE: (comparing two unlike things or conditions) in order to argue for the  mere citizenship of those born overseas,  and  NOT to confer Natural born citizen status upon them.  This is an antiquated rhetorical device more commonly employed in the 18th Century in order to present a sort of pro forma argument, in this case, for the mere citizenship of those born overseas.

3)  Some  have argued that the terms of the Constitution might be altered merely by Congressional legislation, rather than an Article V amendment,  with this intention being particularly applied to the term of art “Natural Born Citizen” utilized only in Article II, thereby enabling Congress to change the requirement for President at its whim, such as:

  • Matthew Spalding Ph.D.,  formerly the Vice President of American Studies at the Heritage Foundation, and currently  Dean of Educational Programs at Hillsdale College, who appeared before a 2004  Senate Judiciary Committee hearing  (page  19) held for the purpose of expanding the original meaning of “natural born citizen” to make the office of President more inclusive,  even to include naturalized persons,   and those born to parents overseas in service of the military, and other things.  Spalding specifically testified that the 1790 Naturalization Act’s reference to natural born citizen “clearly” (in his biased opinion) shows that the Founders viewed it was within Congress’ authority to establish a “uniform rule of naturalization”.  Spalding even closed by disclosing his own personal bias, referencing his adoption of two Russian orphans, whom he described being “as natural born citizens.”    We should instinctively recognize this argument as false due to the fact that natural born citizen status has nothing to do with any sort of naturalization, and does not fall under that authority of Congress.    We can now recognize Spalding’s entire argument referencing the 1790 Naturalization Act as establishing precedent for Congress to alter the terms of the Constitution by mere legislation, as entirely false and corrupt.

Both Matthew Spalding and Jack Maskell, allegedly American history scholars,  each conspicuously failed to address the fact that the 1795 Naturalization Act entirely repealed the 1790 Naturalization Act, and was a near-verbatim repeat of that Act, except entirely removing the reference to “natural born citizen”.   The failure to address this conflict with their arguments strongly indicates an agenda in disregard of fact.

  • Numerous legislation attempts to redefine “natural born citizen” by statute or amendment, including but not limited to Senate Bill  S. 2678, “Children of Military Families Natural Born Citizen Act”, which intended to modify the meaning “natural born citizen” by inappropriate means, when the phrase is a term of art from Natural Law, which is by definition outside of man-made Positive Law, and entirely beyond the reach of such statutory manipulation.

The evidence indicates these approaches to altering the Constitution are entirely invalid. 1790 Naturalization Act – “Considered As” That 1790 Naturalization Act, this country’s very first act of naturalization,  indicates:

“And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born Citizens .,,”

Many have believed the phrasing “shall be considered as natural born Citizens” was intending to confer natural born citizen status upon those born overseas. However new information has surfaced indicating this to not be the case. In 1789, only a year before the 1790 Act,  James Madison made a similar reference addressing natural born, also employing the same phrasing “considered as.”  Many employ this Madison reference similarly to the 1790 Naturalization Act,  to argue against the two citizen-parent terms:

“It is an established maxim, received by all political writers, that every person owes a natural allegiance to the government of that country in which he is born. Allegiance is defined to be a tie, that binds the subject to the state, and in consequence of his obedience, he is entitled to protection… The children of aliens, born in this state, are considered as natural born subjects, and have the same rights with the rest of the citizens”

Madison, 1789

In this address Madison references the children of aliens born on American soil, as being “considered as” natural born .  I believe this reference is not actually intending to confer on those alien children “natural born” status, nor even recognize them as just “citizens”, but rather was Madison’s indication these alien children born on U.S. soil are entitled to fundamental rights,  i.e.  property, due process, etc. Many assume that these two references to “natural born” represent the deliberate expansion of the terms for natural born citizen, but evidence exists showing such interpretations to not actually be the case. THE EVIDENCE: Only 5 years after that 1790 Naturalization Act, Congress specifically repealed that Act, replacing it with the 1795 Naturalization Act, which was a nearly verbatim repeat of the previous 1790 Act, except without any reference to natural born citizen whatsover.  Many “authorities” conspicuously overlook reference to this 1795 Act’s specific and deliberate repeal of that 1790 Act.

What if the 1790 reference to “natural born citizen” is not actually an expansion of the terms at all? And what explains the abrupt removal of that language in 1795, never to have it appear again in any naturalization law over the course of this country’s history? Perhaps these two concerns are linked. On June 14, 1967, Representative John Dowdy introduced an unpublished article to the U.S. House of Representatives. The unpublished article was written by Pinckney G. McElwee, titled “Natural Born Citizen”.    In 1795, James Madison himself actually expressed concern that some might erroneously infer, from the 1790 Act, that the foreign-born children of American parents actually “are” (not merely “considered as”) natural born citizens. McElwee indicates:

Mr. James Madison, who had been a member of the Constitutional Convention and had participated in the drafting of the terms of eligibility for the President, was a member of the Committee of the House, together with Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts and Thomas A. Carnes of Georgia when the matter of the uniform naturalization act was considered in 1795. Here the false inference which such language might suggest with regard to the President was noted, and the Committee sponsored a new naturalization bill which deleted the term “natural-born” from the Act of 1795. (1 Stat 414) The same error was never repeated in any subsequent naturalization act.

(McElwee, Natural Born Citizen, 1967, Page 10)

Again recollect that the previous Madison 1789 quotation and the 1790 Naturalization Act both use the exact same phrasing of   “considered as natural born” (citizens/subjects).   By McElwee’s own report, Madison was involved in having the “natural born citizen” reference in the 1790 Naturalization Act, entirely removed in the 1795 Naturalization Act, so that the reference would not be misunderstood.   Given the similar phrasing in the quotation, perhaps Madison was even influential in drafting that 1790 Naturalization Act. What “Considered As” Actually Intends

Rather than any actual intent to expand the terms of “natural born” by statutory means, which is now known to be untrue given McElwee’s reference,  these writings are actually using an archaic rhetorical device, no longer employed. The 1790 Naturalization Act’s use of “considered as”, and Madison’s 1789 quote as well, are actually employing SIMILE, comparing two inherently unlike things, to argue for the citizenship of offspring not otherwise recognized as being citizens, and not to confer natural born citizen status upon those born overseas.  “Considered as” does not equate to “shall now become.” This use of simile was a common rhetorical form used in the 18th century,  so as to provide a pro forma argument, in the case of the 1790 Naturalization Act,  promoting the mere citizenship status of those born overseas.   Such an argument for mere citizen status is more reasonably the purpose of any naturalization act, and NOT to declare them natural born citizens. This fact would explain why the phrase was entirely removed from the subsequent 1795 Naturalization Act, never to be seen again in American statute. It certainly makes no sense that, before the ink was even dry on the Constitution,  those same founders who so deliberately set the terms for President, would then leap to expanding the phrase natural born citizen to a group of persons that might never set foot on American soil. This is supported by the 1795 Naturalization Act, written by largely the same congress, which specifically REPEALS the 1790 Act, and recreates it nearly verbatim, except excluding any reference to natural born citizen, as well as the discovery by McElwee of the motivation of the House Committee for removing the phrasing, as detailed in 1 Stat 414 . ref